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RRIEF QP APPELLAnT 
S'T'A'l'PlENT OF THE CASE 
~he Appellant, William L. Forsyth, anpeals from 
the order denying him the right to withdraw his plea of 
guilty and the judament and sentence of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah Countv, State of Utah, the Honorable 
J. Robert Bullock, presiding. 
DISPOSI':'ION Itl THE LOHER COURT 
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock, after a hearina 
on the Appellant's motion to withdraw his auilty plea, 
denied that motion on ~arch 31st, 1976 and sentenced the 
Appellant to a term in the State Penitentary on April 
9th, 1976, with execution of that sentence staye~ nendinn 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGH':' ON APPFAL 
Appellant resnectfully reauests that the order 
and judqnent of the District C:ourt, denyincr the l!otion 
to withdraw the plea of nuilty, he reversed and that 
Appellant he allowe~ to enter a olea of not cruiltv and 
be granted his righc to a fair trial by an impartial iurv. 
STATErlF'I'l' OF 'I')!T-: FACTS 
On or ahout Aunust l~th, 1975, Appellant ~as 
arraigned on five counts of theft by deception for alleged 
violations of Sections 7(i-fi-405 ann 7fi-fi-412, Utah Code 
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Ann. (1953 as amended). The charging statute and complaint 
describe this as a specific intent crime. The statute 
states: "Theft hy deception. (1) A person col1ll'1its theft 
if he obtains or exercises control over property of another 
by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof." 
Each of the five counts in the indictment contain the 
language that "at the time and place" the monev was taken 
"by deception and with a purpose and intent to deprive 
said individuals of the same." 
Trial was set for January 5th, 1976. On ,January 
5th, 1976, the trial was continued until Fehruarv 2nd, 
1976 because Appellant and defense counsel had not then 
met together sufficiently to a~eauately prenare the defense. 
The reasons given by Appellant and his counsel for the 
delay were that Appellant had not heen able to nav his 
attorney, a~? =~·r ~0 ~culd not reasonably make the ex-
tensive demands on the attorney's time necessary for adc-
quate preparation. (Hearing Transcript of January 5th, 
1976 P. 5). Appellant had been lead to believe hv his 
attorn~y, that the attorney would he unable to successfully 
defend him against the charae because of Appellant's in-
ability to pay necessary fees and expenses. (Affidavit 
of February 27, 1976, p.3). As an additional rnnc0rn to 
Mr. Forsyth at the time of the scherluleri trial on .Lllwarv 
-2-
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5th, his attorney had hefore the Court a motion to withdraw 
as counsel. 
In a hearing before t~e Court on January 30th, 
1976, Appellant requestect permission to change his plea 
as to Count 1 of the information and the State agreed 
to dismiss the remaining Counts. (Hearing Transcript of 
January 30th, 1976, p.2). lfhen asked by the Court whether 
he was pleading guilty to Count 1 because he was guilty, 
Appellant initially responded that he was chanaina his 
plea for another reason. (Hearina Transcript of January 
30th, 1976, p.6). He had been lead to believe that he 
could olead "no contest" instead of quiltv to Count 1. 
(Hearing ~ranscript of Fehruary 27th, 1976, o.3). After 
a brief conference in the hall with defense counsel and 
the prosecutor, APpellant made the plea of quilty. (Hearinq 
Transcript of Januarv 30th, 1976, p.B). Durinq the con-
ference, the prosecutor cor.mented to the APpellant that 
he would face a "red-necked" jurv, which would prohahly 
convict him in all Counts, if he did not plead auiltv, 
and both defense counsel and the prosecutor represented 
to Appellant that he would likely get probation hv pleading 
guiltv. (Affidavit of Februarv 27th, lQ76, p.3). 
On February 27th, lq76, prior to sentencina, 
Appellant petitioned to the Court to withdraw the plea of 
_,_ 
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guilty and substitute a plea of not guilty. Appellant 
asserted his innocence and that the plea was not knowinolv 
or voluntarily made because of the intimidations of the 
prosecutor and the lack of adequate representation and 
undue influence of defense counsel. (Affidavit of February 
27th, 1976). Defendant testified that he did not know that 
he was scheduled to enter a guilty plea until just five 
minutes prior to entering Court, thinking instead that 
he was to enter a "no contest" or nolo contendre plea. 
(Transcript of February 27th, 1976, p.3). 
On March 22, 1976, in a hearing to consider the 
motion to withdraw the plea, the Court heard a proffer of 
evidence from the State and from the defense. (Hearing 
Transcript of !larch 22, 1976). '~'he Court employed a probable 
cause standard in accessing the sufficiency of the State's 
evidence to prn~e a~ilt. (Hearing Transcript of 'larch 'i, 
1976, p.25). Subsequently, on March 31, lq76, the Motion 
to withdraw the plea was denied, and Defendant was sentenced 




APPELLANT 1 S GUILTV PLEA \~AS NOT MADE VOU!Wl'l\TULY, 
\'liTH OUT UNDUE Il!FL\JENCE, OR \JNDEPS'T'l\'!DI J,I\.LY. 
_A_ 
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~~e stanoarc for a valid auilty plea is expressed 
in Strona v. ~·~r-;er, 22 Uta!-1 2d 2q4, 1!52 P.2d 323 (19fi9), 
wherein it \.;as stat!'d that "a plea of auilty must be made 
voluntaril~·, •,;it~out: urcduc influence or coercion. 
Id. at 296, 324. Ir, that cas:> it was further coMinenter1 
"that under sore circunstances the extraction of a plea 
to one charae as a condition to the disnissal of others 
might tc ·--.:.s~-:-: st..:::!-1 a nanner as to amount to undue in-
fluence or coercion, ~hic!-1 would neaate t~e voluntariness 
of t:,e olea." Ici. at 296, 324. In t~e oresent case t~e 
prosecution's re~arks ~o appellant ccrcerni~~ the aopellant 
havinc to ~ace a "re~-neckec" or hanaina jurv, constituted 
undue in~lt..ence in exac~ina a olea of quiltv as a conoition 
for the d~srissal o~ the c~her charces. 
Further, such oressure fron the nrosecution would 
be class:~:e~ as a "subtle threat" within the rneanina of 
It Has said 
there ~:-:a~ .s_.;c:-; ac':s ::ic:l-:: he "n. oerfect cover up of un-
tu +: 1 c:-. J. ~ 
a~ 243. ~he prosecution oid not 
~l~~dra~ the olc3 anti the oenial of 
a dcr1~l oF thP ~noellant's consti-
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partial jury. 
The short delay between the entering of the plea 
and the assertion of innocence evidenced a stronq indication 
that the plea was entered in haste and confusion. Confusion 
in the Appellant's mind as to the i~pact and the reasons 
for the plea was evident in his initial assertion to the 
Court that there was another reason for enterinq the plea 
besides making a plea of guilty. He did not want to admit 
guilt. He maintained that he was innocent. He had in 
fact made a tactical decision to plead "no contest" when 
faced with counsel's representations that adequate defense 
would not be forthco~ing without pay. At the time t!r. 
Forsyth entered his plea of guilty, he was still under 
the opinion, in the words of his attorney, " . that unless 
he paid me I would ~ot represent him. . and that ~e was 
embarrassed and fel r: ~ t: <,;oulri he futile to contact me until 
he had raised sun1e :-ctoney." (Ilccaring Transcript of c1anuary 
5th, 1976, p.S). Appellant was unable to raise any money 
for his attorney and under all these pressures resiqned 
himself to entering a "no contest" plea. !lis clile~\J'la Has 
further co~pounded when five minutes prior to enterinq his 
plea he was informed that "no contest" was not a valid plea 
and was confronted with the subtle threats in the hall from 
the prosecution and his o1m defense attorney. (J!Parinq 
-()-
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Transcript of Feb. 27, 1976, p.3). 
As long ago as State v. Lee Lim, 79 TJtah 6R, 89, 
7 P.2d 825, 833, (1932) this Court gave the indication that 
a guilty plea that was "influe~ced unduly or improperly 
either hy hope or fear, or that .•• was entered by reason 
of mistake or misapprehension or undue influence," should 
properly be alloHed to he withdraHn. If Appellant's af-
fidavit and other arauments made to the Court concerning 
the undue in:luence exerted on the Appellant were inadequate 
to satisfy the District Court, then Appellant's offer of 
further sHorn testimony should have been accepted. (Hearing 
Transcript of March 5, 1976, p.3) 
With a showing of undue influence on the part 
of the prosecution and the misunderstanding on the part 
of the Appellant, the Appellant should have been granted 
his right to Hithdraw the plea to insure preservation of 
his constitutional rights to due process and a fair jury 
trial. 
~he transcript of the hearing of January 10th, 
at which time the plea of quilty was entered must be con-
sidered in liaht of the evidence contained in Appellant's 
affidavit in Supnort of :lotion to !'iithdra1~ Plea and other 
evidence hefore the Court. ~he Accellant claims that 
he only "ilctecl out" his rertuired role before ,TudCJe nullock, 
-7-
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having been intimidated and coerced into saying what the 
Court, his attorney and the prosecutor obviously wanted, 
to allow the guilty plea to be accepted. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN USING A PROBABLE CAUSE 
STANDARD OF PROOF IN ASSERTAINING IF 
THERE WAS A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA OF GUILTY 
Probable cause is the standard of proof applied 
to justify a search or seizure. u.s. Constituion, Amendment 
IV, Utah Constitution, Art. I, §14. The assertion of prob-
able cause must be supported by sworn oath or affirmation 
before the Court. Id. The Defendant, his counsel and the 
prosecutor stipulated to the Court's hearing an offer of 
proof of the evidence against the accused and in his defense. 
The Court determined that such offer of proof would he 
unsworn and considered on the basis of probable cause. 
(Hearing Transcr~~t 0f ~arch 5, 1976, p.S). 
Since the rendering, acceptance and retention 
of a guilty plea over the objections of the accused is an 
even more serious action than a search or seizure and con-
stitutes at least a waiver of a basic constitutional right, 
it requires a higher standard of proof than a mere showing 
of probable cause. A guilty plea in fact hccomcs more than 
a waiver of constitutional riqhts; it is itself a conviction. 
Boykin, supra, at 242. 
-8-
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The Appellant's plea of guilty and statement that 
he was gulity were later offset by his frequent assertions 
and claims of innocence. In North Carolina v. Alford, 
400 U.S. 25, 27 (1974) the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
a factual basis for accepting a plea of guilty which was 
coupled with assertions of innocence, was adequately es-
tablished with the showing of "strong evidence of guilt". 
This required standard is a higher ·level of proof than the 
"reasonahle grounds to believe" test and the "what the State 
thought it could prove and intended to prove" standard as 
used in this case. (Hearing Transcript of March 22, 1976, 
p.l8). 
Considering the qravity, impact and finality of 
a guilty plea, the Court should have used a higher level 
of proof and required strong and convincino evidence from 
the prosecution before denying the Motion to withdraw the 
plea. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF A PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD OF PROOF 
WAS NOT PROPER, TPE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
tlOT AD1CQUATI'LY ASCERTAiniNG IF TPERE I•JAS 
A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA OF GTJILTY. 
The Federal Courts have stressed that "quilt pleas 
coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted 
unless there is a factual basis for the plea •. North 
Carolina v. Alford, surra, at 38. In Alford the denied 
•vithclruwal of the rl r>il 1vac; not an ahusc of discretion hecause 
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the prosecution presented "strong evidence of quilt and 
the defendant had no substantial evidentary support for 
the claim of innocence. In determining the factual basis 
for the plea in Alford, the Court heard the sworn testimonies 
of a police officer who summarized the State's case, two 
other witnesses, and the defendant. That evidence was held 
to be sufficiently strong to prevent a reversal. 
In the present case such "strong evidence", to 
establish the required factual basis is absent. (See Tran-
script of Hearings of March 22, 1976). There were only 
the assertions of the prosecutor as to what the State's 
evidence would be. Even if probable cause was the proper 
standard of proof to apply, oath or affirmation was not 
made supporting the showing of probable cause. There was 
no sworn testimony. There were no affidavits or depositions 
I 
of witnesses. Even ~he integrity of some of the prosecutions 
recorded infor~3tio~ was challenged by defense counsel. 
(Hearing Transcript of March 22, 1976, p.l7, 18). The 
losses of one of the alleged victims were challenged, but 
were not substantiated by the prosecution. ~~en defense 
counsel challenged the proposed evidence as inad~issahle, 
no attempt was made to establish its admissability. 
A credible claim of meritorious defenses was also 
raised by defense counsel undermining any claim the pro-
secution may have had for stron~ evidence of quilt. ncfense 
-10-
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counsel raised substantial issue as to whether the nros-
ecution could prove the required intent of the alleqen 
crime. Here again, no sworn testiMony or anv direct evidence 
was offered to establish a factual basis for that element. 
Without adequate, strong evidence establishing a factual 
basis for the plea, it was error to deny the \dthdrawal 
of the plea. 
POINT IV 
THE DE1liAL OF APPELLAilT 1 S MOTION TO lVITHDRAN 
THE GUILTY PLEA l"lAS Ml ABUSE OF THE COURT 1 S DIS-
CRETIO'l RESULTI!JG IN ~.ANIFEST INJUSTICE A'lD UNFAIRNESS. 
llo prejudice to the State \vould have ensued with 
the granting of the /lotion to withdraw the plea as was 
admitted by the prosecution, but by denying the motion 
the trial Court prevented the Appellant from gettinq a 
fair trial before an iMpartial jury. Further, since the 
motion was a pre-sentence request, it was not a hidden 
challenqe to the Judqe 1 s sentence. The fact that the 
Appellant asserted his leqal innocence was an important 
factor to be weighed. Indeed, in such cases a ore-sentence 
withdrawal should be freely granted. United States V. Joslin, 
140 U.S. App. DC 252, 434 F2d 526 (1970). 
POINT V 
JI.PPF.LLA!JT \'IllS Df"JIF.D EFFF.CTIVE COPNSF.L 
IN RF:GARn TO 111\KI'JG TilE PLEA OF GfliLTY. 
Appellant assPrtcrl hy affidavit that defense 
counsel lr"l hif1 to br'lie\'t' the~t lwcause he was unahle to 
-11-
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pay counsel that his defense would be jeopardized. Ap-
pellant further maintained that the defense counsel had 
not adequately represented him from the time the continuance 
was granted on January 5, 1976, until the time that the 
Appellant requested withdrawal of the plea. Although 
Appellant expressed the feeling that the defense counsel 
was capable of adequately representing him, and in fact 
he desired that defense counsel continue to represent him 
because of his familiarity with the case, Appellant did 
maintain that representation had been inadequate and mis-
leading during the time the guilty plea was entere~. 
Counsel had lead him to believe that an adequate defense 
could not be presented without prepayment of fees to the 
attorney and paynent of professional fees to an accountant, 
(Hearing Transcri~t of January 5, 1976, p.7), and that 
Appellant coul~ :_k0i~ expect probation by pleading quilty. 
There was direct lmplication made that Defendant would 
be treated more strictly with a finding of guilt as opposed 
to a plea of guilt. Neither contention was conteste~ hv 
either defense counsel or the prosecution. Such actions 
on the part of the defense counsel caused fear and mis-
apprehension for the Appellant of un~esirahle cons~c1uences 
if he did not plead guilty. 
-12-
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The importance of safeguarding the right to 
adequate counsel at the time of the entry of a guilty plea 
was emphasized in Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 121, 
449 P. 2d 241, 243 (1969). Such a challenge to the adequecy 
of counsel as in the present case merited further inquiry 
by the Court or at least rebuttal by the prosecution. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant contends that the guilty plea was 
made under the stress of undue influence and coercion from 
the prosecution and defense counsel and that he should 
have the right to withdraw that plea. Further, it is 
contended that the trial Court abused its discretion 
by denyina the withdrawal, resulting in manifest injustice 
to Appellant. No prejudice to the State would have ensued, 
but the Appellant, asserting innocence ~as denied a hearing 
before an impartial jury. Additionally, in the face of 
Appellant's claims of innocence, no adequate factual basis 
for accepting the plea was established. Appellant was 
further denied the riaht to effective counsel because of 
his financial circumstances. 
Appellant therefore respectfully requests that 
the judqrnent of the lower court be reversed to all01v Ap-
pellant to withdraw the plea of guilty and substitute a 
plea of not guilty. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Steven L. Gro\v, 
Attorncv for Appellant 
-13-
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